HAT role do a person's opportunities to choose play in the justification of social arrangements? We need to answer this question in order to arrive at a theory of substantive responsibility, which tells us the way in which a person's claims on others, others' claims on her, and the quality of her situation should depend on the opportunities she has and the choices she makes.
will be carried out with care, the removal of this material will inevitably release harmful particles into the air, which, if inhaled, will cause lung damage. Workers involved in the removal will be protected by special equipment, and the inhabitants of the town will be safe if they stay indoors on the day of the excavation and transport.
Suppose that we have two options. Our first option is to have a very thorough information campaign, which will ensure that everyone in the town receives a standard warning message and can take the necessary steps to protect her/himself. (Call this policy Inform Everyone.) From our knowledge of similar situations, we can confidently predict that almost everyone will indeed protect her/himself, but that there will be one person, though we can't know who this person is, who will impetuously visit the excavation site even though she is aware of the danger to her health; she visits nonetheless because the standard warning aroused her curiosity about the nature of the hazardous material and the process of excavation. As a consequence, she will develop a severe and incurable case of emphysema. (Call her Curious.)
The second policy option is to spend more money on each individual sign, leaflet, and announcement, in order to describe the effects of exposure with particularly vivid and persuasive images. (Call this policy Vivid Warning.) On the basis of our knowledge of similar situations, we can confidently predict that these images will move everyone who receives the warning-even those who are especially curious-to heed it. However, because the leaflets and announcements will be more costly to produce, the campaign's coverage will be somewhat less extensive. As a consequence, though an attempt will be made to reach everyone, we can confidently predict that one person will remain uninformed and will be outside on his daily stroll on the day of the excavation. (Call this person Walker. Again, suppose we don't know who this person will be.)
Suppose that Curious and Walker are equally well-off prior to the hazardous material removal, and that the harm suffered by Curious under Inform Everyone is just as great as the harm suffered by Walker under Vivid Warning. The characteristics of these individuals' opportunity sets and their levels of welfare under these two policies are summarized in Table 1 .
Which policy, if any, should we prefer? I take it that a common response would be that we should give priority to preventing the harm that Walker would suffer under Vivid Warning over preventing the harm that Curious would suffer under Inform Everyone, because under the latter policy, Curious would be in a position to avoid the harm by choosing appropriately, whereas under the former policy, Walker would not be. In this article, I aim to formulate a perspective on the justificatory role of a person's opportunities to choose that adequately accounts for this judgment and other related case judgments. My discussion will proceed through a critical examination of Scanlon's views on the topic. In Section I, I examine Scanlon's Value of Choice view, which holds that if a person is given opportunities which generally lead people to avoid harm, then this alone is sufficient to make it the case that she has no valid complaint about what results (WWO, p. 258) . I argue that Scanlon is not justified in assessing the value of a person's opportunities by the value of the things people generally achieve when faced with these opportunities, and that the Value of Choice view cannot, therefore, provide a reason for favouring Inform Everyone over Vivid Warning.
and Barbara Combs, "How safe is safe enough? A psychometric study of attitudes towards technological risks and benefits," Policy Science, 9 (1978), 127-52; John Graham, "Some explanations for disparities in lifesaving investments," Policy Studies Review, 1 (1982) In Section II, I examine the Forfeiture view, which Scanlon regards as a rival perspective on substantive responsibility. This view holds that someone cannot complain of harm that she suffers only because of her voluntary choice (WWO, p. 259) . I argue that we should reject this view because it pays insufficient attention to the importance of protecting people against harm which they might incur through unwise choices.
In Section III, I propose what I call the Potential Value of Opportunities view, which holds that in justifying social arrangements, we should attend to the potential value of a person's opportunity set. This value depends on the various outcomes that he can achieve by choosing from this set, and on how well placed he is, given his dispositions to choose, to achieve the good and avoid the bad outcomes. I argue that this view can explain why we should prioritise preventing harm that people cannot avoid by choosing appropriately over preventing harm that they can avoid; moreover, I claim it can also explain why it is important to protect people against choices through which they might come to harm.
I. THE VALUE OF CHOICE VIEW Scanlon characterises his Value of Choice account as follows:
According to the Value of Choice account what matters is the value of the opportunity to choose that the person is presented with. If a person has been placed in a sufficiently good position, this can make it the case that he or she has no valid complaint about what results, whether or not it is produced by his or her active choice (WWO, p. 258).
Scanlon proposes that we determine the value of a person's opportunities to choose with reference to "the positive reasons that people have for wanting opportunities to make choices," and he distinguishes three such reasons (WWO, . The first is what he calls the instrumental value of choice: the value choice has in securing states of affairs that we have reason to seek. This value is conditional on the degree to which, for a given object of choice, a person's capacities, dispositions and conditions of choice will help him achieve the ends he has reason to seek. It is also relative: it depends on the usefulness of his being given a choice as compared to other means of achieving these ends.
The second is the representative value of choice. This is the value we put on seeing features of ourselves manifested in our actions and their results. Examples are gifts, where the significance of the gift is determined by having chosen it oneself, and creative work, where part of the point of the work is that it reflects the author's attitudes and abilities.
The third is the symbolic value of choice. We may want outcomes to depend on our choices not merely because this will be a more efficient way of achieving our ends or because we want our choices to reflect our values, thoughts and capacities, but also because not having such choices would be taken as an indicator that we are not competent enough to make them.
Though it may well be that we should add further values to this list, I will follow Scanlon in attending to these values alone. Indeed, in the context of our hazardous waste removal case, I will follow Scanlon in assuming that only the first of these three values applies. As he writes:
The Value of Choice account that I am proposing explains the role of choice in the justification of moral principles by appealing to the reasons . . . we have for wanting outcomes to depend on the way we respond when presented with alternatives. In the present case these reasons are purely instrumental. . . . So according to the Value of Choice account 'giving people the choice' is, like the fences, the careful removal techniques, and the remote location of the new site, just another means through which the likelihood of injury is reduced (WWO, p. 257).
Given this assumption, Scanlon recognises that it would be natural to conclude that in the context of this example, a person's circumstances of choice are good when they lead her to avoid harm and bad when they do not (WWO, . This would mean that Curious' circumstances of choice under Inform Everyone are bad, because her receipt of this warning does not decrease the likelihood of her coming to harm, since, as Scanlon puts it, "the [standard] warning only aroused her impetuous curiosity, and she would have been better off if she had never been told at all" (WWO, p. 261). Given that her circumstances of choice would appear to be bad from the perspective of the one value relevant to their assessment, it would seem that on the Value of Choice view, we cannot appeal to the quality of these circumstances to discount the harm suffered by Curious under Inform Everyone. It therefore seems that the Value of Choice view cannot regard the fact that Curious would be informed under Inform Everyone and that Walker would not be under Vivid Warning as a reason to choose Inform Everyone.
Scanlon responds to this line of argument as follows. Curious is placed in a sufficiently good situation when she receives the standard warning just because being given the standard warning is generally speaking a good thing. As he puts it:
The reason why it is important that this woman was informed of the danger, and thus given the chance of avoiding it, is not that this was necessarily advantageous to her but rather that it is something that people in general have reason to value (WWO, p. 263).
The reason that receiving the standard warning is something people in general have reason to value is that "it is generally sufficient to lead people to avoid coming to harm" (WWO, p. 261).
By contrast, Scanlon writes, Walker is not placed in a comparably good situation under Vivid Warning:
[B]ecause we did not succeed in making him aware of the danger, we did not make what happened to him depend on his response to this information. Given that this dependence is something we all would reasonably want to have under the circumstances, we did not succeed in making this person as well off as one would reasonably want to be (WWO, p. 259).
In sum, given that receiving the standard warning is generally beneficial, because people generally respond to it by avoiding the harm in question, we can regard Curious' situation under Inform Everyone as sufficiently good to make it the case that she has no valid complaint about the harm that results. Under Vivid Warning, by contrast, Walker would be able to complain of the harm he comes to because he was not warned, and being warned generally leads one to avoid harm. If Scanlon's appeal to the general value of a person's opportunities is justified, we would therefore have reason to favour Inform Everyone over Vivid Warning. But is it?
Scanlon justifies it by arguing that in assessing a person's situation, we should only appeal to what he calls "generic reasons . . . that we can see that people have in virtue of certain general characteristics" rather than to "the reasons that a specific individual may have, given all the facts about his or her situation" (WWO, pp. 205, 263) . Scanlon offers two reasons for appealing to generic reasons in evaluating a person's situation. The first is that not all of a person's preferences and projects give rise to moral claims on us; we only owe others goods that are useful across a wide range of views of the good life, such as goods required to develop one's capacities, to lead the life one wants with family and friends and to achieve success in one's main endeavours. We also owe them more specific goods like health, leisure and wealth, which are generally judged to be important elements of a good life. 4 This consideration, however, only establishes that in evaluating the quality of Curious' options, we need not consider the satisfaction of her curiosity as something which counts in favour of a policy like Inform Everyone. It does not give us reason to regard Curious as having been placed in good circumstances of choice under Inform Everyone. For she will suffer damage to her health, and this is among the ways in which a person is affected that Scanlon regards as giving rise to legitimate claims.
Scanlon's second reason is that taking into account specific variations in people's needs and circumstances would be more demanding than just paying attention to general characteristics; it would lead to greater uncertainty about whether everyone's claims had been met, and require everyone to gather more information in order to know what moral principles give to and require of her/him. Since this uncertainty and information gathering are costly, we are permitted to refer to generic reasons in the justification of our actions (WWO, p. 205).
I do not think, however, that this cost can be successfully appealed to in order to justify regarding Curious' opportunities to choose under Inform Everyone as valuable. The information we have assumed is available in our case-information about the overall pattern of behaviour induced in a given population by various ways of warning it-is commonly and justifiably gathered and used in public decision-making.
5 (Recall that "Curious" is simply a placeholder for the anonymous individual who we know will come to harm under a particular policy, so that no special assumptions are involved about knowledge of named individuals' dispositions to choose.) It therefore seems that we are entitled to use this information and conclude that Curious' receipt of the standard warning does not increase her likelihood of avoiding harm, and therefore does not benefit her.
In sum, the Value of Choice account is unable to offer a convincing explanation of why the fact that Curious would be warned under Inform Everyone places her in a better situation than Walker would be under Vivid Warning. It is therefore unable to explain why we should choose Inform Everyone in this case.
II. THE FORFEITURE VIEW
This failing of the Value of Choice view should lead us to examine the view that Scanlon regards as its closest competitor, which he calls the Forfeiture view. Scanlon characterises this view as follows: "a person who could have chosen to avoid a certain outcome, but who knowingly passed up this choice, cannot complain of the result: volenti non fit iniuria" (WWO, p. 259).
Concerning the situation Curious would be in under Inform Everyone, Scanlon writes that a proponent of the Forfeiture view would reason as follows:
Since she had been warned of the danger, and chose to go to the site anyway, we are inclined to say that she is (substantively) responsible for her own injury; and it is this fact, rather than the amount that has been done to protect her or the cost to others of doing more, that makes it the case that she cannot blame anyone for what happened. By choosing, in the face of warnings, to go to the excavation site, she laid down her right to complain of the harm she suffered as a result (WWO, p. 258).
The core idea of the Forfeiture view, then, is that someone who is well-informed and has an accessible option that it is reasonable to take and through which she would avoid coming to harm, but who freely makes a conscious choice to pass up this option, cannot complain if she ends up badly as a result. This core idea no doubt requires some qualification. A defender of the Forfeiture view would presumably allow someone to complain of harm that they 5 It is, for example, no different in kind to the information used by governments who are replacing written descriptions of smoking-caused health damage on cigarette packages with vivid images depicting the same harm because the latter are more effective. See David Hammond, Geoffrey T. suffered because of their choice of an alternative if there was no good reason for the harm to be connected to that alternative. We should therefore assume that there is adequate justification for the connection between the harm and the person's action. In the context of our example, this condition is met, because we assumed that the case for removing the hazardous material was overwhelming, and that there was no way to remove the material without affecting the health of people who ventured outside during its excavation and transport. This means that, on the Forfeiture view, while Walker can complain of the harm he would suffer under Vivid Warning, Curious cannot complain of the harm she would incur under Inform Everyone. If we then assume, as it seems natural to do, that we should choose a policy which does not impose a burden of which someone can complain over a policy which does impose a burden of which someone can complain, then it follows that we should choose Inform Everyone over Vivid Warning. The Forfeiture view therefore offers an explanation of the common judgment with which we began.
Scanlon offers two points of criticism of the Forfeiture view. The first is that it places undue weight on the special legitimating force of voluntary action (WWO, p. 260). What is important, Scanlon claims, is a person's opportunity to choose, rather than his conscious decision to pass up specific alternatives. Scanlon argues that we should appeal to the former rather than the latter because there are cases in which it seems right to offer the options a person has as part of the justification of an arrangement under which he ends up badly through an action of his own, even if he never consciously considers all relevant aspects of this action. We can illustrate this with the following case, which is again adapted from Scanlon's discussion (WWO, p. 259).
Imagine that in our hazardous material example, we can confidently predict that under both Inform Everyone and Vivid Warning there will be a person-whose identity, again, we do not know-who, though he was warned, and though generally of sound mind and capable of remembering things and running his own affairs, will simply forget the warning. (Call this person Forgetful.) As a result, he will be outside exercising during the transport of the material and suffer damage to his health.
Scanlon argues that the case of Forgetful illustrates that it is not active choice, but the quality of the circumstances in which a person was placed that is of moral significance. For, he argues, Forgetful does not consciously decide to take a dangerous action; nevertheless, if he is warned, then, Scanlon believes, his claim should be treated like the claim of Curious, who makes a conscious decision to take the dangerous action:
If . . . enough was done to warn him, then this man is, like [Curious] , fully responsible for what happens to him, even though he made no conscious decision to take the risk. From the fact that a person, under the right conditions, took a certain risk, we may conclude that he alone is responsible for what happens to him as a result. But this need not be seen as reflecting the special legitimating force of voluntary action, in the way that the Forfeiture view would suggest. The mere fact that he was placed in conditions in which he had the choice of avoiding the risk may be sufficient (WWO, Contrary to what Scanlon seems to suggest, however, the case of Forgetful does not constitute a counterexample to the Forfeiture view. For Scanlon's definition of the Forfeiture view specifies that informed choice under certain circumstances is a sufficient condition for not being able to complain of a result, not that it is a necessary one. Therefore, if Scanlon's judgment about Forgetful is correct, then all this proves is that both informed, voluntary choice and negligence can be grounds for not being able to complain of a result of one's actions.
Scanlon's second objection to the Forfeiture view runs as follows. He points out that the Forfeiture view must stress the fact that Curious can do otherwise than she does under Inform Everyone. But, he argues, identifying this fact as the crucial one leads to implausible results in other cases, since, he writes, "there are many conditions that undermine the legitimating force of choice despite the fact that a person choosing under such conditions still 'could have done otherwise' in any sense that would apply in this case" (WWO, p. 262).
Scanlon gives the following example of a case in which there are such other conditions that undermine the legitimating force of choice:
It would, for example, be reasonable to reject a principle according to which a long-term contract is binding even when entered into by a fourteen-year-old without adult guidance. What is special about the case of fourteen-year-olds is not that they cannot choose wisely (after all, many of them do), but rather that they are so likely not to do so (WWO, p. 262, emphasis in original).
The challenge Scanlon puts to the Forfeiture view is to explain what makes it the case that informed, voluntary choice does not play a justificatory role in the case of fourteen-year-olds when it does play this role in the case of Curious under Inform Everyone, while not referring to the fact that fourteen-year-olds are unlikely to choose wisely-for that is also true of Curious under Inform Everyone.
A defender of the Forfeiture view could respond that Curious, like other normal adults, is assumed to have a certain amount of knowledge, experience and cognitive capacities, like the ability to reflect coolly on what she will do and fully appreciate the potential consequences, and a degree of self-control that fourteen-year-olds typically lack. This knowledge and these capacities are, like the availability of an accessible option through which one could avoid harm and that it would be reasonable to take, necessary conditions for choice to have the moral force the Forfeiture view accords it. Though, as the Forfeiture view theorist will readily acknowledge, these conditions usually make it more likely that a person will choose well, their import is not reducible to their contribution to a person's choosing well, or to any additional value that choice has. They simply make it reasonable for us to ask of people that they look out for themselves. In sum, Scanlon's second objection lacks force because a defender of the Forfeiture view can happily agree with Scanlon's claim that "there are many conditions that undermine the legitimating force of choice despite the fact that a person choosing under such conditions still 'could have done otherwise'." Though Scanlon's objections to the Forfeiture view fail, there is, I believe, a more forceful objection: it appears to pay insufficient attention to the importance of protecting people against harm that they might incur through unwise choices. 6 By way of illustration, consider again the situations of Walker and Curious. Suppose that while Vivid Warning is no longer an option, it becomes possible to excavate and transport the material under a cover in such a way that the particles released cause only minor harm on exposure (say, an unpleasant cough for a week, with no lasting effects; call this policy Low Emissions). Under Low Emissions, an attempt will be made to warn everyone of the moderate danger of visiting the excavation site and of being outside during transport. However, the cost of lowering emissions makes it impossible to ensure that everyone will receive this warning. Assume that, as a consequence, under Low Emissions, Walker will be taking a stroll during the transport because he is uninformed of the danger. Curious, by contrast, will receive the warning and stay inside because she knows that the excavation site will be covered, and she will not be able to see precisely what is going on. The opportunity sets and outcomes associated with Inform Everyone and Low Emissions are listed in Table 2 .
From the Forfeiture view's perspective, we should choose Inform Everyone, because Curious could not complain of the severe damage to her health that results from Inform Everyone, whereas Walker could complain of the minor harm he would suffer under Low Emissions.
I believe, by contrast, that we should choose Low Emissions over Inform Everyone in this case, and that the Forfeiture view is therefore mistaken. The reason it is mistaken is that it fails to adequately register that in one important respect, the situation in which Curious is placed under Inform Everyone is bad, because she will be strongly disposed to choose an option through which she will come to great harm. This means that under Inform Everyone, she is exposed to a significant danger, since there is a significant risk that she will choose badly and suffer the consequences. 7 We are all familiar with the idea that it is bad to be 6 A similar criticism of views of responsibility that appear to be close to the Forfeiture view is offered by Marc Fleurbaey, "Equal opportunity or equal social outcome?" Economics and Philosophy, 11 (1995) , 25-55; Elisabeth Anderson, "What is the point of equality?" Ethics, 109 (1999), 287-337; and Richard Arneson, "Luck and equality," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, 75 (2001) , 73-90. These papers do not, however, share my diagnosis of the problem with the Forfeiture view, namely, that it does not account for the badness of being exposed to the danger of choosing badly. 7 This danger of choosing badly is distinct from the costs that the presence of a tempting option might impose on a prudent decision-maker, and which the Forfeiture view might be able to take into account. Examples of such costs are the time and mental effort involved in decision-making, the steps that the decision-maker would have to take to avoid choosing imprudently, and any feelings of exposed to this type of danger, because we are familiar with various ways in which someone might choose badly in spite of being able to determine and pursue the best course of action. For one, a person might simply never take the time to think things through and work out what the best course of action is. (An example is Forgetful mentioned above, who, we can imagine, is occupied by other matters when he receives the warning, puts off thinking about what to do in the light of it until later, and then forgets it.) Alternatively, a person might deliberate about his options and fail in a variety of ways to develop a proper appreciation of the relevant reasons for action, because his deliberation is clouded by excessive desire.
8 He might, for example, talk himself into adopting certain false beliefs because he wants them to be true. (Think of an employee who, wanting to view X-rated web-pages while in the office persuades himself of the false belief that his boss would never find out if he did so.) Or, while in the grip of a desire, he might give the wrong weight to certain considerations. (An example is someone, who infatuated with a beautiful car that he cannot really afford, incorrectly regards frustration which would flow from failing to satisfy her desire for the tempting option. For a discussion of some costs of choosing see Gerald Dworkin, "Is more choice better than less?" in his The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 62-81. 8 The following comments draw on Aristotle's discussion of the nature of our knowledge in acting imprudently in Nichomachean Ethics, trans. and ed. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1999), 2nd edn, 1146b33-1147b19. I am indebted to Luc Bovens for helpful discussions on this topic. the pleasure of owning it as outweighing the financial difficulties he knows that its purchase would impose on him.) Or he may arrive at the right conclusion through deliberation but fail to acquire the conviction that these beliefs should bring, because such conviction would lead to behaviour that is contrary to a strong desire. (An example is a smoker who believes the written warnings provided on cigarette packages and concludes he should stop smoking, but because of his fondness for smoking, fails to develop the conviction that he should stop smoking until confronted with vivid images of people wasting away from lung cancer.) Finally, he may arrive at the right conclusion through deliberation but fail to abide by it because of weakness of will. Curious' situation under Inform Everyone should be understood as one in which she suffers from weakness of will, or is prone to at least one of the aforementioned desire-induced failures to acquire the proper conviction that she should stay inside during the excavation and transport of the material. A good account of the justificatory role of a person's opportunities should take note of this way in which Curious' circumstances of choice under Inform Everyone are less than ideal, because in cases like this, where our policies inevitably shape people's circumstances of choice, people have a claim to be placed in conditions in which they are disposed to choose well and avoid harm. 9 The Forfeiture view should be rejected, I believe, because it does not recognise claims of this kind. In the following section, I attempt to develop a view that does recognise such claims.
III. THE POTENTIAL VALUE OF OPPORTUNITIES VIEW
On what I will call the Potential Value of Opportunities view, when a person is in a position to freely and capably make an informed choice, we assess her situation not by the outcome she achieves but by what I will call the potential value of her opportunities. 10 This value depends on the value of the various things that she can achieve through her choices, as well as on how disposed she is to choose her better options and avoid her worse options. By contrast, when 9 As mentioned in footnote 1, I assume throughout that individuals have not had an opportunity to choose their dispositions.
10 Dirk Van de Gaer, in Equality of Opportunity and Investments in Human Capital (Ph.D. Thesis, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 1993) and subsequent work, particularly with John Roemer, in "A pragmatic theory of responsibility for the egalitarian planner," Philosophy & Public Affairs, 22 (1993) , 146-66, has developed social choice rules which are based on the value of individuals' opportunities. I follow these authors in addressing questions of substantive responsibility by appealing to the value of a person's opportunities. I also agree with them that in evaluating a person's opportunities, we should take account of the outcomes he can choose to achieve and his dispositions to choose. However, as Matthias Hild and I have argued in "Equal opportunity and opportunity dominance," Economics and Philosophy, 20 (2004) , 117-45, Roemer's and Van de Gaer's measures are flawed. (See also Marc Fleurbaey, Fairness, Responsibility, and Welfare [Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming] for a comprehensive discussion of these measures.) The principles for ranking opportunity sets that I put forward here are a first step towards developing an alternative to Van de Gaer's and Roemer's measures. Another interesting contribution which draws on Roemer's work is Peter Vallentyne, "Brute luck, option luck, and equality of initial opportunities," Ethics, 112 (2002), 529-57. While I believe that Vallentyne's measure of the value of a person's opportunities someone cannot reasonably be expected to choose differently than she does, then this account is only concerned with how she ends up.
In the context of our example, this view holds that we should look at the potential value of the opportunities that Walker has under Inform Everyone, as well as the potential value of the opportunities that Curious has under Inform Everyone, Vivid Warning and Low Emissions, and not at the outcomes they achieve through their choices from these opportunities. For in all these cases, Walker and Curious have the information and capacities required to avoid harm by choosing appropriately. The Potential Value of Opportunities view also requires that we only look at how Walker ends up under Vivid Warning and Low Emissions, because under these policies he cannot reasonably be expected to avoid coming to harm by choosing appropriately. The information that the Potential Value of Opportunities view judges relevant to our evaluation of these policies is summarised in Table 3 . For the sake of brevity, I will refer to the value of the cells in Table 3 as follows: V[C, IE] stands for "the value of Curious' opportunity set under Inform Everyone" and V[W, VW] stands for "the value of Walker's outcome under Vivid Warning," etc.
Let us now see what we should say about the potential value of the opportunity sets in question, starting with the comparison between Inform Everyone and Vivid Warning.
11 In each of the three opportunity sets under consideration in this comparison, the worst option leads to a state in which one's health is severely and permanently impaired. Each of these sets also contains an option which leads to a better outcome. Each of these opportunity sets therefore enables its possessor to achieve a better outcome than ending up with severe, permanent health damage without exposing its possessor to the danger of making a choice through which he or she would end up in a state that is worse than living with severe health damage. We should therefore regard these opportunity sets as more valuable than ending up in a state of severe, permanent health damage. It follows that each of V [W, IE] , V [C, IE] and V[C, VW] is greater than V[W, VW].
As we noted above, when an opportunity set exposes someone to the possibility that she will choose badly and come to harm as a result, then it exposes her to a danger. Being exposed to this danger is a bad thing, and renders her opportunity set less valuable. The magnitude of this danger is an increasing inherits some of the flaws of Roemer's approach, I share the view expressed on p. 549ff of his article that taking account of a person's dispositions to choose in evaluating her opportunity set can ensure that one accounts for the value of protecting people against choosing badly.
11 In line with my assumption in section 1, I will focus only on the potential instrumental value of a person's opportunities. A fuller account would include the contribution that other forms of value, such as the aforementioned symbolic and expressive value and perhaps the value of autonomy, make to the potential value of a person's opportunities. An interesting starting point for this work may be provided by the literature reviewed in Salvador Barberà, Walter Bossert and Prasanta Pattanaik, "Ranking sets of objects," The Handbook of Utility Theory, Vol. II: Extensions, ed. Salvador Barberà, Peter Hammond and Christian Seidl (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004), pp. 893-977. function of the magnitude of the harm and the degree to which she is disposed to act imprudently. As the magnitude of the danger increases, the value of her opportunities declines.
12
This has the following implications for the relative values of the three opportunity sets under consideration. While Walker is not disposed to choose badly under Inform Everyone, Curious may be somewhat disposed to do so under Vivid Warning, and she is highly disposed to do so under Inform 12 Of course, being exposed to the danger of coming to harm through choosing badly differs from being exposed to a danger that one cannot avoid by choosing appropriately. In line with the common judgments outlined at the start of this article, we should hold that the person who would face a danger of incurring a harm that she could avoid by choosing appropriately has less of a claim for this danger to be eliminated than someone who would face an equivalent danger of a harm that he could not so avoid. In our example, this implies that though the value of Curious' opportunity set under Inform Everyone is diminished because she will be tempted to act in a way that leads to her suffering severe, lasting health damage, her opportunity set is nonetheless more valuable than a state in which a person will certainly suffer a harm of the same severity that he could not reasonably be expected to avoid. [C, IE] . As discussed, Curious is exposed to a significant danger under Inform Everyone because she is strongly disposed to choose an option which leads to great harm. The present question is whether this danger so diminishes the value of her opportunities that they are less valuable than a state in which one suffers a minor, temporary ailment. The argument that it does diminish the value of her opportunities to this extent runs as follows. When our decisions shape people's conditions of choice, people have a claim to be placed in conditions in which they are disposed to choose well and to avoid harm. In the case under consideration, we are therefore required to give the aim of lessening the danger of coming to harm through poor choices some weight in our decision-making. Moreover, though we are entitled to give priority to eliminating a danger of suffering a harm that one cannot avoid by choosing well over eliminating a danger of coming to harm by choosing badly, this priority is not absolute. As the magnitude of the danger of coming to harm through choosing badly increases vis-à-vis the magnitude of the danger of suffering harm that one cannot avoid by choosing appropriately, there is a point at which the claim to be rid of the danger of ending up badly through one's choice becomes stronger than the claim to be rid of the danger that one will suffer a harm one cannot avoid by choosing appropriately. In my view, this point is reached in this case: given the great difference in the magnitudes of the dangers involved, Curious' claim not to be placed in circumstances in which she will be strongly tempted to choose imprudently is greater than Walker's claim not to suffer a minor, temporary ailment. It follows that V[W, LE] > V[C, IE], which completes the argument in favour of Low Emissions.
The core of the argument for choosing Low Emissions over Inform Everyone is, therefore, that Low Emissions removes a significant danger that Curious will choose badly and come to great harm as a result, and that this improvement in her circumstances of choice outweighs the minor harm that Walker will come to under Low Emissions.
In sum, by appealing to the value of being given an opportunity to avoid harm, and the value of being placed in circumstances in which one is disposed to make good use of this opportunity, the Potential Value of Opportunities view can explain our judgments in our two cases in an appealing way. It explains the priority we give to preventing harm that a person cannot avoid by choosing appropriately over harm that a person can so avoid by the fact that the second 14 The reason that we cannot conclude that V[C, LE] > V[W, IE] is that it is not clear that either opportunity set involves any danger of choosing badly. Given that neither chooser is disposed to choose the second-best option, one might argue that the fact that Walker's second-best option under Inform Everyone is worse than Curious' second-best option under Low Emissions is of no importance for the evaluation of their opportunity sets.
person has a valuable opportunity that the first does not have. It explains the importance of protecting people against choosing badly by its account of the value of being placed in circumstances in which one is disposed to choose well, and the disvalue of being exposed to the danger of coming to harm by choosing badly. The Potential Value of Opportunities view therefore appears to offer a promising account of the role of a person's opportunities to choose in the justification of social arrangements.
